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Abstract. A definition of secure multi-party key exchange in the Canetti-
Krawczyk proof model is proposed, followed by a proof of the security of
the Joux tripartite key agreement protocol according to that definition.
The Joux protocol is then combined with two authentication mecha-
nisms to produce a variety of provably secure key agreement protocols.
The properties and efficiency of the Joux based protocols thus derived
are then compared with each other and other published tripartite key
agreement protocols. It is concluded that the Joux protocol can be used
to generate efficient yet provably secure protocols.
1 Introduction
A major goal of modern cryptography is to enable two or more users on an
insecure (adversary controlled) network to communicate in a confidential man-
ner and/or ensure that such communications are authentic. In order to realize
this goal, symmetric key cryptographic tools are often used due to their effi-
ciency compared to public key techniques. However, use of such tools requires
the creation of a secret key (which is typically at least 100 bits long) known
only to the users communicating with each other. Because of the impracticality
of each possible pair of users sharing a long term secret key, public key and/or
password-based techniques are used to generate such a key when it is required.
An advantage of this method of key generation is to keep different sessions inde-
pendent, which enables the avoiding of replay attacks (since the wrong key will
have been used for the replay) and lessens the impact of key compromise (since
only one session will be exposed, not all previous communications).
Although recent progress has been made on the use of formal proof models
to prove the security of key exchange protocols, one area where further work
is required is the use of formal proof models in conjunction with tripartite key
agreement protocols. Tripartite key agreement enables three parties to exchange
a key so that they can all participate in a session. It can also be used to enable
two parties to communicate in the presence of a third party who may provide
chairing, auditing, data recovery or escrow services [1]. In 2000, Joux [13] pro-
posed a tripartite key exchange protocol based on pairings on an elliptic curve
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(such as the Weil or Tate pairing) that required only one round, but was subject
to a man-in-the-middle attack due to its lack of any authentication mechanism.
Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] have modified the Joux protocol in a variety of ways
to overcome this problem, yet without adding to the number of rounds required
by the protocol. However, only one of their protocols was accompanied by any
sort of formal security proof, and that proof did not allow adaptive adversaries.
In fact, flaws were found in preliminary versions of their protocols, demonstrat-
ing the difficulty of ensuring protocols are not flawed without the use of formal
security proofs.
In this paper, we provide security proofs for Joux-based tripartite key agree-
ment protocols that provide (implicit) key authentication. To do this, we adopt
the Canetti-Krawczyk proof model [9] (hereafter referred to as the ck-model),
which was based on the model of Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [3]. The ck-
model offers the advantage of allowing modular proofs, thus allowing different
components to be proven secure separately, and then joined together to produce
a secure key exchange protocol. It also leads to simpler, less error-prone proofs
and the ability to construct a large number of secure protocols from a much
smaller number of basic secure components.
The modularity of the ck-model is gained by applying a protocol translation
tool, called an authenticator, to protocols proven secure in a much simplified
adversarial setting where authentication of the communication links is not re-
quired. The result of such an application is secure protocols in the unsimplified
adversarial setting where the full capabilities of the adversary are modelled.
Unfortunately, the definition of secure key exchange provided by the original
ck-model only caters for two parties, and so a modification of the definition is
required to cater for tripartite key exchange. Such a modification is proposed
in this paper, in conjunction with the analysis of the security and efficiency of
the Joux [13] protocol. It transpires that the Joux based protocols proposed and
proven secure in this paper require the same number of messages as an ordi-
nary discrete logarithm based tripartite Diffie-Hellman protocol. However, the
Joux based protocols have smaller messages and require a comparable amount
of computation.
2 Overview of the Canetti-Krawczyk Approach
Here a description of the ck-model is given. Further details can be found in [3]
and [9]. The ck-model defines protocol principals who may simultaneously run
multiple local copies of a message driven protocol. Each local copy is called a
session and has its own local state. Two sessions are matching if each session has
the same session identifier and the purpose of each session is to establish a key
between the particular two parties running the sessions. A session is expired if the
session key agreed by the session has been erased from the session owner’s mem-
ory. A powerful adversary attempts to break the protocol by interacting with
the principals. In addition to controlling all communications between principals,
the adversary is able to corrupt any principal, thereby learning all information
in the memory of that principal (e.g. long-term keys, session states and session
keys). The adversary may impersonate a corrupted principal, although the cor-
rupted principal itself is not activated again and produces no further output or
messages. The adversary may also reveal internal session states or agreed ses-
sion keys. The adversary must be efficient in the sense of being a probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm. An unexposed session is one such that neither it nor
a matching session has had its internal state or agreed session key revealed, and
if the owner of the session or a matching session is corrupted, the corruption
occurred after the key had expired at the corrupted party.
Definition 1 (Informal). An ake protocol is called session key (sk-) secure
if the following two conditions are met. Firstly, if two uncorrupted parties com-
plete matching sessions, then they both accept the same key. Secondly, suppose
the adversary chooses as a “test session” one that is completed, unexpired and
unexposed. Then if the adversary is given either the session key (in this case let
b = 0) or a random string (in this case let b = 1), each with probability 1/2, the
probability of the adversary correctly guessing which one it received (i.e. correctly
guessing the value of b) is not greater than 1/2 plus a negligible function in the
security parameter.
Two adversarial models are defined: the unauthenticated-links adversarial
model (um) and the authenticated-links adversarial model (am). The um corre-
sponds to the “real world” where the adversary completely controls the network
in use, and may modify or create messages from any party to any other party.
The am is a restricted version of the um where the adversary may choose whether
or not to deliver a message, but if a message is delivered, it must have been cre-
ated by the specified sender and be delivered to the specified recipient without
alteration. In addition, any such message may only be delivered once. In this
way, authentication mechanisms can be separated from key agreement mecha-
nisms by proving the key agreement secure in the am, and then applying an
authentication mechanism to the key agreement messages so that the overall
protocol is secure in the um.
An authenticator is a protocol translator that takes an sk-secure protocol
in the am to an sk-secure protocol in the um. Authenticators can be con-
structed using one or more message transmission (mt-) authenticators. An mt-
authenticator is a protocol which delivers one message in the um in an authen-
ticated manner. To translate an sk-secure protocol in the am to an sk-secure
protocol in the um an mt-authenticator can be applied to each message and the
resultant sub-protocols combined to form one overall sk-secure protocol in the
um. However, if the sk-secure protocol in the am consists of more than one mes-
sage, the resultant protocol is usually optimized to reduce the number and size
of messages, involving reorder and reuse of message components. This practice
was used in the ck-model proposal [9], although without a formal security proof.
The ck-model automatically ensures that secure protocols also provide per-
fect forward secrecy [9] through the use of session expiration. The ck-model
also ensures that secure protocols are immune to unknown key share attacks [7,
pp. 139–140]. This can be shown by contradiction. Suppose that an unknown
key share attack exists on an sk-secure protocol. Then the two sessions knowing
the secret key are not matching, since the identities of the supposed participants
are different. Hence the adversary can choose one session as the test session and
reveal the key in the other session and so achieve a non-negligible advantage.
However, this contradicts the assumption of sk-security. Key compromise im-
personation attacks [7, p. 52] are not covered by the ck-model since parties are
unable to send or receive messages after corruption (it is only possible for the
adversary to send or receive on the behalf of the corrupted party).
3 Definition of Secure Tripartite Key Exchange
The definitions of key exchange protocols and sk-security in the am and um
provided by Canetti and Krawczyk in [9] are restricted to the case of two par-
ticipants. It is necessary to extend the existing definitions to cater for at least
three parties for use with tripartite key exchange. Therefore, the input to a key
exchange protocol running within each party with identity Pi is redefined to
be (D, sid, role), where sid is the session identifier, D = {Pi, Pj , Pk, . . .} is
the set of identities of participants in the key exchange and Pi ∈ D. We make
the new requirement that one and only one publicly available function, f , be
specified (for the purpose of linking party identities to session identifiers). It
is then required that for all inputs of the form (D, sid, role) to key exchange
protocols, f(D, s, d) = 1 for some d, and f(D′, s, d′) = 0 for any set D′ 6= D
and any d′ (including d′ = d). It is also required that sid be unique to each
party using it. As an example, let D = {Pi, Pj , Pk}, let H be a collision re-
sistant hash function, and let Ni, Nj and Nk be nonces freshly generated by
Pi, Pj and Pk respectively, where the nonces are of a sufficient length that
the probability of any one of them previously having been generated is neg-
ligible. Defining s = H(Pi ‖ Pj ‖ Pk ‖ Ni ‖ Nj ‖ Nk) (where ‖ indicates
concatenation) and defining f({Pi, Pj , Pk}, s, (Ni ‖ Nj ‖ Nk)) = 1 if and only if
s = H(Pi ‖ Pj ‖ Pk ‖ Ni ‖ Nj ‖ Nk) satisfies all of the above requirements.
Definition 2 (Matching). Any u sessions (where each session is run by a
different party) are matching if each session has the same session identifier.
In particular, any two sessions with the same session identifier are said to be
matching.
Definition 3 (Session key security). A t-party ke protocol pi is called session
key (sk-) secure in the am (respectively um) if the following two properties hold
for any adversary A (respectively U) in the am (respectively um).
1. Protocol pi satisfies the property that if t uncorrupted parties complete a set
of t matching sessions then they all output the same key.
2. The probability that A (respectively U) guesses correctly the bit b from the
test-session (i.e. outputs b′ = b) is no more than 1/2 plus a negligible function
in the security parameter (i.e. no better than a random guess).
The two requirements of the definition of sk-security in the t party case
directly correspond to those in the two party case. The modified requirements
regarding the session identifier are the major change in the case of key exchange
involving more than two parties. The identities of the participants are linked
to the session identifier to make it easy to avoid scenarios where two or more
sessions have identical keys but are not matching due to different beliefs by the
sessions about who is participating in the protocol.
It is worth noting that in the ck-model, since uncorrupted protocol partici-
pants always follow the protocol, a protocol participant, say A, can trust another
participant, say B, to pass on correct input from a third party, say C. The first
party, A, does not need to receive an authenticated message from C, but only
an authenticated message from B. A trusts that B received an authenticated
message from C containing the information that B forwarded to A.
4 Tripartite Key Exchange Protocol in the AM
The notation used by the tripartite key exchange protocol is as follows:
A, B, C : Protocol participants exchanging a secret key.
P : Base point of the elliptic curve.
G1 : Points on an elliptic curve with a suitable pairing.
G2 : Group of the same size as G1.
n : Order of G1 and G2.
e : G1 ×G1 −→ G2 : An admissible bilinear map (properties are below).
σYX :
Signature by X intended for Y . Specifying the intended recipient clar-
ifies the purpose of each signature in protocol descriptions, although
in practice the intended recipient need not be specified.
XEY :
Encryption by X intended for Y . Specifying the sender clarifies the
purpose of each encryption in protocol descriptions, although in prac-
tice the sender does not necessarily need to be specified.
An admissible bilinear map must be bilinear, non-degenerate and com-
putable [5]. That is, the map must satisfy e([a]P, [b]Q) = e(P, Q)ab for all
P, Q ∈ G1 and all a, b ∈ Z, the map must not send all pairs in G1 × G1 to
the identity in G2, and there must be an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q)
for any P, Q ∈ G1. It is possible to construct an admissible bilinear map based
on either the Weil pairing or Tate pairing over an elliptic curve [12, 5].
Joux has described an unauthenticated broadcast tripartite key exchange pro-
tocol which requires only one round [13, 19]. In the protocol, each party chooses
a random value a ∈R Zn and broadcasts [a]P to the other two parties. The
shared key is computed as e(P, P )abc, where a, b and c are the random values
chosen by the three parties. Since no authenticators are available for broadcast
protocols, two unicast versions (Protocols 1 and 2) are examined in the am. A
session identifier, sid, has been added to all protocol messages, and Protocol 2
uses one party to act as messenger between the other two parties to reduce the
total number of message flows. The value of sid is not specified here, but the
ck-model assumes it to be known by protocol participants before the protocol
begins. In practice, the session identifier may be determined during protocol ex-
ecution [9, 20]. It is assumed that messages in the am implicitly specify sender
and receiver. If it is not possible to determine the identities of all protocol par-
ticipants from sid (e.g. the case where sid contains a hash of the identities), it
may be necessary to include the identities of the participants in the first two
messages from A. However, since all parties must ensure the correctness of sid,
such “hints” can be omitted from the formal protocol specification.
A on input (A, B, C, sid) : C on receipt of (sid, [a]P ) :
A→ B : (sid, [a]P ), a ∈R Zn C → A : (sid, [c]P ), c ∈R Zn
A→ C : (sid, [a]P ) C → B : (sid, [c]P )
B on receipt of (sid, [a]P ) : Shared Key : e(P, P )abc = e([b]P, [c]P )a
B → A : (sid, [b]P ), b ∈R Zn = e([a]P, [c]P )
b
B → C : (sid, [b]P ) = e([a]P, [b]P )c
Protocol 1: Joux protocol in the am without broadcast messages
B → A : (sid, [b]P ) (where b ∈R Zn)
C → A : (sid, [c]P ) (where c ∈R Zn)
A→ B : (sid, [a]P, [c]P ) (where a ∈R Zn)
A→ C : (sid, [a]P, [b]P )
Key : e(P, P )abc = e([b]P, [c]P )a = e([a]P, [c]P )b = e([a]P, [b]P )c
Protocol 2: Variant of Joux protocol in the am that can be used with authen-
ticators to create efficient um protocols
In order to prove the security of Protocols 1 and 2 in the am, it is necessary
to assume that the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (dbdh) is hard.
The assumption has been studied by Cheon and Lee [11], and can be described
similarly to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption [9] as follows:
Definition 4 (DBDH assumption). Let e : G1 ×G1 → G2 be an admissible
bilinear map that takes as input two elements of G1 and outputs an element of
G2. Let n be the order of G1 and G2, and let P be an element of G1. Let two
probability distributions of tuples of seven elements, Q0 and Q1, be defined as:
Q0 = {〈G1, G2, P, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P, e(P, P )
abc〉 : a, b, c ∈R Zn} and
Q1 = {〈G1, G2, P, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P, e(P, P )
d〉 : a, b, c, d ∈R Zn}.
Then the dbdh assumption states that Q0 and Q1 are computationally indistin-
guishable.
Theorem 1. Given the dbdh assumption, Protocols 1 and 2 are both sk-secure
in the am.
The proof of Theorem 1 is similar to that of two party Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [9] and is provided in the full version of this paper. It is possible to
modify the protocol so that the use of the dbdh assumption in the proof can
be replaced with the use of a random oracle. This also requires the proof to
use the assumption that the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (bdh) problem is hard. Let
e : G1×G1 → G2 be an admissible bilinear map that takes as input two elements
of G1 and outputs an element of G2. Let n be the order of G1 and G2, and let
P be an element of G1. Then the bdh problem [5] is to find e(P, P )
abc when
given (G1, G2, P, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P ), where a, b and c ∈R Zn. If the bdh problem
is hard, there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the bdh problem with
non-negligible probability.
One way to modify the protocol to use this proof method is to combine
e(P, P )abc with some sort of hash function to produce the key (e.g. H
(
e (P, P )
abc
)
or a keyed hash function He(P, P )abc ([a]P, [b]P, [c]P )). The logic of the proof is
based on the observation that since the hash function is completely random, the
adversary can only obtain information about the session key by querying the
hash function oracle with the input that would have been used to generate the
session key. However, if the adversary is able to produce such a value with which
to query the oracle, then the adversary is also able to break the bdh problem,
which was assumed to be hard. The formal proof proceeds in a similar fashion
to that of the proof using the dbdh assumption.
5 Applying Authenticators to the Joux Protocol
In order to create an sk-secure protocol in the um, it is necessary to apply one or
more authenticators to the Joux protocol. Here we focus on two authenticators
originally proposed by Bellare et al. [3], λsig (requiring the use of a signature
scheme secure against adaptive chosen message attacks [17]) and λenc (requiring
the use of an encryption scheme indistinguishable under chosen ciphertext at-
tacks [4] and a secure mac scheme). Their specifications are given by Protocols 3
and 4.
Protocol 3: λenc
A B
m
−→
NB ∈R {0, 1}
k
m, BEA(NB)
←−−−−−−−−−
m,macNB (m, B)
−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Protocol 4: λsig
A B
m
−→
rB ∈R {0, 1}
k
m, rB
←−−−
m, σBA (m, rB , B)
−−−−−−−−−−−→
Protocols 3 and 4: Encryption and signature-based mt-authenticators, λenc
and λsig
Applying λsig to each message of the Joux protocol (Protocol 1) results in an
eighteen message protocol. However, it is possible to optimize this protocol to
produce a much more efficient version. This can be done by replacing the nonce
denoted by rB in λsig with [a]P , [b]P or [c]P (depending on which party was
required to generate the nonce). In addition, in most cases, the two signatures
produced by each party can be combined to a single signature containing one
copy of each of the items originally contained in the two separate signatures.
Finally, only the session identifier needs to be included at the beginning of each
um message to determine to which session the messages belong. (In the specifica-
tion of the mt-authenticators, the messages were unique and the entire message
from the am was included at the start of each um message for this purpose since
there were no session identifiers.) The resultant protocol in the um is shown by
Protocol 5 and requires a total of five messages and four signatures.
A→ B : (sid, [a]P ) (where a ∈R Zn)
B → C :
(
sid, [a]P, [b]P, σAB (A, sid, [a]P, [b]P )
)
(where b ∈R Zn)
C → A :
(
sid, [b]P, [c]P, σA,BC (A, B, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P ) , σ
A
B (A, sid, [a]P, [b]P )
)
(where c ∈R Zn)
A→ B :
(
sid, [c]P, σB,CA (B, C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P ) , σ
A,B
C (A, B, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
B → C :
(
σCB (C, sid, [b]P, [c]P ) , σ
B,C
A (B, C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
Key : e(P, P )abc = e([b]P, [c]P )a = e([a]P, [c]P )b = e([a]P, [b]P )c
Protocol 5: Joux protocol authenticated with λsig
It is possible to combine σAB(A, sid, [a]P, [b]P ) and σ
C
B (C, sid, [b]P, [c]P ) from
Protocol 5 into one signature at the expense of an extra message, as shown by
Protocol 6. Protocol 7 is another possible um protocol where some messages have
been combined after the authenticator has been applied to create a broadcast
protocol. It has five broadcasts and three signatures.
A→ B : (sid, [a]P ) (where a ∈R Zn)
B → C : (sid, [a]P, [b]P ) (where b ∈R Zn)
C → A :
(
sid, [b]P, [c]P, σA,BC (A,B, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
(where c ∈R Zn)
A→ B :
(
sid, [c]P, σB,CA (B, C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P ) , σ
A,B
C (A, B, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
B → C :
(
σA,CB (A,C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P ) , σ
B,C
A (B, C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
B/C → A : σA,CB (A, C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
Key : e(P,P )abc = e([b]P, [c]P )a = e([a]P, [c]P )b = e([a]P, [b]P )c
Protocol 6: Joux protocol authenticated with λsig using a minimal number of
signatures
The λsig authenticator can be applied to Protocol 2 and then optimized to
produce Protocol 8 in the um. It requires five messages but only three signatures.
A→ B, C : (sid, [a]P ) (where a ∈R Zn)
B → C, A : (sid, [b]P ) (where b ∈R Zn)
C → A, B :
(
sid, [c]P, σA,BC (sid, A,B, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
(where c ∈R Zn)
A→ B, C :
(
sid, σB,CA (B, C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
B → A, C :
(
σC,AB (A, C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
Key : e(P, P )abc = e([b]P, [c]P )a = e([a]P, [c]P )b = e([a]P, [b]P )c
Protocol 7: Joux protocol authenticated with λsig, broadcast version
A→ B : (sid, [a]P ) (where a ∈R Zn)
B → C :
(
sid, [a]P, [b]P, σAB (A, sid, [a]P, [b]P )
)
(where b ∈R Zn)
C → A :
(
sid, [b]P, [c]P, σAC (A, sid, [a]P, [c]P ) , σ
A
B (A, sid, [a]P, [b]P )
)
(where c ∈R Zn)
A→ B :
(
sid, [c]P, σB,CA (B, C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
A or B → C :
(
sid, [c]P, σB,CA (B, C, sid, [a]P, [b]P, [c]P )
)
Key : e(P, P )abc = e([b]P, [c]P )a = e([a]P, [c]P )b = e([a]P, [b]P )c
Protocol 8: Variant of Joux protocol authenticated with λsig
A protocol resulting from applying the λenc authenticator to the am Joux
protocol and optimizing it is described by Protocol 9. The optimized protocol
requires a total of five messages, six encryptions and six macs. Allowing messages
to be broadcast does not change these requirements.
A→ B : sid, [a]P, AEB(NAB),
AEC(NAC)
B → C : sid, [a]P, [b]P, BEC(NBC),
BEA(NBA), MACNAB (sid, [b]P, A),
AEC(NAC)
C → A : sid, [b]P, [c]P, CEA(NCA),
CEB(NCB), MACNAC (sid, [c]P, A),
MACNBC (sid, [c]P, B),
BEA(NBA), MACNAB (sid, [b]P, A)
A→ B : sid, [c]P, MACNBA(sid, [a]P, B),MACNCA(sid, [a]P, C),
CEB(NCB),
MACNBC (sid, [c]P, B)
B → C : sid, MACNCB (sid, [b]P, C), MACNCA (sid, [a]P, C)
Key : e(P, P )abc = e([b]P, [c]P )a = e([a]P, [c]P )b = e([a]P, [b]P )c
Protocol 9: Joux protocol authenticated with λenc
Another protocol using λenc can be constructed in the um, by using the
variant of the Joux protocol in the am (Protocol 2). The optimized version is
shown by Protocol 10 and requires five messages, four encryptions and four macs.
In a broadcast version of the protocol, the last two messages can be combined
into one broadcast so that only four messages are required. However, the same
number of encryptions and macs are still required by the broadcast version.
A→ B : sid, [a]P, AEB(NAB),
AEC(NAC)
B → C : sid, [a]P, [b]P, BEA(NBA), MACNAB (sid, [b]P, A),
AEC(NAC)
C → A : sid, [b]P, [c]P, CEA(NCA), MACNAC (sid, [c]P, A),
BEA(NBA), MACNAB (sid, [b]P, A)
A→ B : sid, [c]P, MACNBA(sid, C, [a]P, [c]P, B), MACNCA(sid, [a]P, [b]P, C)
A/B → C : sid, MACNCA(sid, [a]P, [b]P, C)
Key : e(P, P )abc = e([b]P, [c]P )a = e([a]P, [c]P )b = e([a]P, [b]P )c
Protocol 10: Variant of Joux protocol authenticated with λenc
6 Efficiency of Joux Based Protocols in the UM
Table 1 shows the efficiency of each of the different optimized protocols in the
um described in Section 5. The table shows that the efficiency of each scheme
depends heavily on the signature or encryption scheme chosen for the imple-
mentation. Since the protocols will be executed using an elliptic curve where a
pairing is available that can be used as the basis of an admissible bilinear map
(as defined at the beginning of Section 4), the suitability of various pairing-based
signature and encryption schemes for the above protocols has been investigated.
A brief description of each scheme is included below, and the efficiency of each
scheme summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 1. Operations and messages required by tripartite um protocols
Protocol number 5 6 8 8 7 9 10 10
Broadcast used N N N Y Y N/Y N Y
Messages 5 6 5 4 5 5 5 4
Signatures 4 3 3 3 3 - - -
Verifications 6 6 4 4 6 - - -
Encryptions - - - - - 6 4 4
Decryptions - - - - - 6 4 4
macs - - - - - 6 4 4
Scalar mults. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Exponentiations 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Pairings 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
M-L This identity-based signcryption scheme was proposed by Malone-Lee [16].
A summary of its efficiency is also provided by Nalla and Reddy [18]. The
scheme provides non-repudiation if the plaintext is surrendered to the party
required to perform an independent verification. The scheme can therefore
be used in place of a signature scheme if desired.
NR This identity-based encryption scheme (requiring a trusted authority) was
proposed by Nalla and Reddy [18]. The trusted authority can also be used
to provide non-repudiation.
Table 2. Efficiency of signature schemes using pairings
Scheme Signature Verification
Pair. Exp. Sc. mul. Other Pair. Exp. Sc. mul. Other
Hess - 1 1 1+(1) 1 -
BLS - - 1 2 - -
CC - - 2 2 - 1
LQ (1) 2 1.4 symm. enc. 2+(2) 1 - symm. dec.
M-L (1) - 3 3+(1) 1 -
SOK - - 2 2 or 3 - -
(y) indicates an additional y operations required in a precomputation.
BLS This scheme to provide short signatures was proposed by Boneh, Lynn
and Shacham [6]. The scheme is not identity-based and allows different sig-
natures to be combined, thus saving bandwidth (at the expense of extra
computation). The scheme can alse be used for batch verification, to increase
verification efficiency if several users sign the same message.
Lynn This scheme to provide authenticated identity-based encryption was pro-
posed by Lynn [15]. The scheme does not provide non-repudiation [14] and
so can not be used in place of a signature scheme. It is noteworthy that
this scheme actually uses fewer pairings than the BF scheme which provides
encryption only. However, the Lynn scheme does require use of symmetric
encryption and decryption algorithms.
CC This scheme to provide an identity-based signature was proposed by Cha
and Cheon [10].
Hess This scheme was proposed by Hess [12] and is an identity-based signature
scheme. The paper also includes a comparison with the cc and sok schemes.
SOK This scheme was proposed by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara and an effi-
ciency analysis is provided by Hess [12].
BF This identity-based encryption scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin [5].
LQ This identity-based signcryption scheme was proposed by Libert and
Quisquater [14]. It can require the use of a symmetric encryption and de-
cryption scheme, and can be used as either a signature or an encryption
scheme since it provides non-repudiation because any party can verify the
origin of the ciphertext. However, verification of the origin of the plaintext
requires the key used for the symmetric encryption to be provided to the
party performing the verification. Another property of the scheme is that
the symmetric encryption and decryption can be replaced by some extra
modular multiplications if the plaintext to be encrypted is only short. The
signcryption requires a total of two scalar multiplications, but these can be
performed together in the time of about 1.4 scalar multiplications.
Although the signcryption schemes can be used as either a signature or encryp-
tion schemes, care must be taken when performing an efficiency analysis of the
resulting um protocol, since extra signatures may need to be created if a single
signature was intended for use by more than one recipient in the original um
protocol.
Table 3. Efficiency of encryption schemes using pairings
Scheme Encryption Decryption
Pair. Exp. Sc. mul. Other Pair. Exp. Sc. mul. Other
Lynn (1) - - symm. enc. (1) - - symm. dec.
BF (1) 1 1 1 - 1
NR (1) 1 2 2+(1) 1 -
option option
LQ (1) 2 1.4 symm. enc. 2+(2) 1 - symm. dec.
M-L (1) - 3 3+(1) 1 -
(y) indicates an additional y operations required in a precomputation.
Since the pairing operation is the most expensive of those performed by
the signature and encryption schemes under consideration, the authenticated
identity-based encryption scheme of Lynn appears to be the most promising
from an efficiency viewpoint. Combining it with the protocol requiring the least
number of operations, Protocol 10, leads to an implementation of the Joux proto-
col in the um requiring three on-line pairings to compute the key (one per party)
and four off-line pairings. Four instead of eight off-line pairings are required since
some of the off-line pairings can be reused and need not be calculated twice.
Table 4 provides a comparison of the number of operations required by Pro-
tocol 10 and those required by the tripartite protocols proposed by Al-Riyami
and Paterson [1] and based on Joux’s protocol, tak-1 to tak-4 and takc. The
table shows that those protocols using broadcast messages (tak-1 to tak-4)
only require 3 messages, which is less than the most efficient of the protocols
proposed here. However, such protocols do not provide message authentication,
only implicit key authentication. Protocol 10 has the advantage that parties ac-
cepting a secret key can be sure that the messages upon which they acted were
not generated by a malicious party or replays of old messages; the other parties
actually participated in the key exchange.
The non-broadcast protocol from [1] (takc) is designed to provide key con-
firmation as well as key authentication. This protocol requires more messages
than Protocol 10 because it provides key confirmation, which is not provided by
Protocol 10. It can be seen that if the time for the precomputation of pairings
required by Protocol 10 is ignored (since the precomputation is reusable for any
key exchange involving the same participants), Protocol 10 is generally more
efficient in terms of number of operations than those of [1], and requires fewer
messages than the takc protocol, but more messages than the tak-1 to tak-4
protocols. In addition, Protocol 10 has an associated proof of security, whereas
the only tak protocol that currently has an associated proof of security is the
tak-1 protocol, but its proof is restricted because it does not allow the adversary
to make any Reveal queries, and therefore does not cater for known session-key
attacks.
Table 4. Operations and messages required by Al-Riyami and Paterson’s tripartite
protocols compared with Protocol 10
Protocol name TAK-1 TAK-2 TAK-3 TAK-4 TAKC 10 10
Broadcast used Y Y Y Y N N Y
Messages 3 3 3 3 6 5 4
Signatures - - - - 3 - -
Verifications - - - - 6 - -
Symmetric
encryptions - - - - 3 4 4
Symmetric
decryptions - - - - 6 4 4
macs - - - - - 4 4
Scalar mults. [3] [3] [3] 6 + [3] [3] [3] [3]
Exponentiations 3 + 〈3〉 6 3 + 〈3〉 3 3 3 3
Pairings 3 + 〈3〉 9 6 + 〈3〉 3 3 3 + (4) 3 + (4)
y + 〈x〉 indicates a total of y + x operations are required, but x operations may be
precomputed if identities and long term keys of participants known in advance. A
new precomputation is required for each key exchange.
y + (x) indicates a total of y + x operations are required, but x operations may be
precomputed if identities of participants known in advance. The precomputation is
reusable for any key exchange involving those participants.
[x] indicates that x operations may be precomputed, but a new precomputation is
required for each key exchange.
It is also possible to compare Protocol 10 with existing schemes for group
key exchange based on the ordinary use of discrete logarithms, such as that of
Bresson, Chevassut, Pointcheval and Quisquater [8], herein denoted the bcpq
scheme. This scheme can be converted to a tripartite key exchange protocol
requiring eight exponentiations (two of which can be precomputed), three sig-
natures and four verifications. If a signature scheme such as dsa is used, signing
takes one exponentiation (which can be precomputed) and verification takes
two simultaneous exponentiations, or about the time of 1.2 single exponentia-
tions. Thus the bcpq scheme takes the total time of 10.8 online exponentiations
and 5 offline exponentiations, whereas Protocol 10 requires 3 exponentiations
and 3 pairings online. Therefore, if a pairing can be computed in the time of
2.6 exponentiations, the Joux based scheme will be as efficient in terms of on-
line computation as the bcpq scheme. Figures due to Barreto, Kim, Lynn and
Scott [2] indicate that a 512 bit pairing takes about 2.5 times as long as a 1024 bit
exponentiation with a 1007 bit exponent (20ms for a pairing compared to 7.9ms
for an rsa signature) or 4.9 times as long as a 1024 bit exponentiation with a
160 bit exponent (20ms for a pairing compared to 4.09ms for a dsa signature).
Thus Protocol 10 compares favourably to the bcpq scheme if a large exponent is
used with that scheme, but not if a small exponent is used. However, there has
recently been a substantial amount of research on improving pairing efficiency,
and it is possible that the efficiency of pairings may improve to the extent that
Protocol 10 is more efficient than the bcpq scheme for small exponents also.
7 Conclusion
The ck-model has been used to examine the security of tripartite key exchange
protocols based on the Joux protocol. A new definition of security for key ex-
change protocols with more than two participants has been provided, and a
proof of security for the Joux protocol in the am given. The efficiency of the
um protocols created by combining the Joux am protocol with signature and
encryption based authenticators has been analysed, and the efficiency of var-
ious pairing based encryption and signature schemes which could be used in
the authentication mechanism has been summarized. It has been concluded that
a secure tripartite key exchange protocol can be formed that requires three on-
line and four off-line pairings. This protocol also compared favourably with other
published tripartite key agreement protocols.
Acknowledgements: This research is part of an ARC SPIRT project (C10024103)
undertaken jointly by Queensland University of Technology and Motorola.
References
1. Sattam S. Al-Riyami and Kenneth G. Paterson. Tripartite authenticated key agree-
ment protocols from pairings. In Cryptography and Coding, volume 2898 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 332–359. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
2. Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, Hae Y. Kim, Ben Lynn, and Michael Scott. Effi-
cient algorithms for pairing-based cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology—
CRYPTO 2002, volume 2442 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 354–368.
Springer-Verlag, 2002.
3. Mihir Bellare, Ran Canetti, and Hugo Krawczyk. A modular approach to the
design and analysis of authentication and key exchange protocols (extended ab-
stract). In Proceedings of the 30th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Com-
puting (STOC ’98), pages 419–428, New York, May 1998. ACM Press. [Full paper
online] http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/modular.ps.gz.
4. Mihir Bellare, Anand Desai, David Pointcheval, and Phil Rogaway. Relations
among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes (extended abstract).
In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO ’98, volume 1462 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 26–45. Springer-Verlag, 1998. [Full paper online] http:
//www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/relations.pdf.
5. Dan Boneh and Matthew Franklin. Identity-based encryption from the Weil pair-
ing. In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2001, volume 2139 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 213–229. Springer-Verlag, 2001. [Full paper online]
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/ibe.html.
6. Dan Boneh, Ben Lynn, and Hovav Shacham. Short signatures from the Weil
pairing. In Advances in Cryptology—ASIACRYPT 2001, volume 2139 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 514–532. Springer-Verlag, 2001. [Full paper
online] http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/weilsigs.html.
7. Colin Boyd and Anish Mathuria. Protocols for Authentication and Key Establish-
ment. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2003.
8. E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, D. Pointcheval, and J.-J. Quisquater. Provably au-
thenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In P. Samarati, editor, Proc. of
ACM-CCS 01, pages 255–264, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, November 2001.
ACM, ACM Press.
9. Ran Canetti and Hugo Krawczyk. Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use
for building secure channels. In Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT 2001, vol-
ume 2045 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 451–472. Springer-Verlag,
2001. [Full paper online] http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/040.ps.gz.
10. Jae Choon Cha and Jung Hee Cheon. An identity-based signature from gap Diffie-
Hellman groups. In Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography—PKC 2003,
volume 2567 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 18–30. Springer-Verlag,
2003.
11. Jung Hee Cheon and Dong Hoon Lee. Diffie-Hellman problems and bilinear maps.
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2002/117, 2002. [Online] http://eprint.iacr.
org/ [accessed 11/07/2003].
12. Florian Hess. Efficient identity based signature schemes based on pairings. In Se-
lected Areas in Cryptography—SAC 2002, volume 2595 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 310–324. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
13. Antoine Joux. A one round protocol for tripartite Diffie-Hellman. In Algorith-
mic Number Theory: Fourth International Symposium—ANTS-IV 2000, Proceed-
ings, volume 1838 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 385–393. Springer-
Verlag, 2000.
14. Benoˆıt Libert and Jean-Jacques Quisquater. New identity based signcryption
schemes from pairings. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/023, 2003. [Online]
http://eprint.iacr.org/ [accessed 11/07/2003].
15. Ben Lynn. Authenticated identity-based encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2002/072, 2002. [Online] http://eprint.iacr.org/ [accessed 11/07/2003].
16. John Malone-Lee. Identity-based signcryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2002/098, 2002. [Online] http://eprint.iacr.org/ [accessed 11/07/2003].
17. Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, and Scott A. Vanstone. Handbook of
Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996.
18. Divya Nalla and K.C. Reddy. Signcryption scheme for identity-based cryp-
tosystems. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/066, 2003. [Online] http:
//eprint.iacr.org/ [accessed 11/07/2003].
19. K.G. Paterson. Cryptography from pairings: a snapshot of current research. In-
formation Security Technical Report, 7(3):41–54, 2002.
20. Yiu Shing Terry Tin, Colin Boyd, and Juan Manuel Gonza´lez Nieto. Provably
secure mobile key exchange: Applying the Canetti-Krawczyk approach. In In-
formation Security and Privacy—ACISP 2003, volume 2727 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 166–179. Springer-Verlag, 2003.
